Rust Belt Legacy Costs

My colleague Steve Eide recently released a paper on Rust Belt legacy costs. His focus is on cities of 60,000 or greater, their population loss from peak, poverty rates, historic manufacturing dependency and current economic mix, and of course their debt and unfunded pension obligations.

The most interesting stats to me were the ones about manufacturing dependency. A lot of these cities had a third or even half of their total jobs in manufacturing back in the day. Though many of them are now eds and meds dependent, the share of total jobs in eds and meds is far lower than with historic manufacturing. Here’s a chart.

Even in 1950, Boston, New York, and even Pittsburgh were already less manufacturing concentrated than other industrial cities. This may have given them a leg up in transformation.

There’s a lot of other interesting data in there so give it a look.

 

from Aaron M. Renn
http://www.urbanophile.com/2017/10/31/rust-belt-legacy-costs/

Nobody Knows Nothing in Corporate America

If you want to understand why a lot of America’s youth embrace socialism today, just look at this small but revealing story about General Electric. Former CEO Jeff Immelt apparently didn’t just fly around the world in a corporate jet, a fairly standard practice, he had an empty spare corporate jet follow him around just in case anything happened to the jet he was actually using.

Now that the news has come out, supposedly the board wasn’t informed about this, and even Immelt himself says he didn’t know. How convenient. The plane had a bogus passenger manifest designed to make it look occupied, and everyone was instructed to keep it hush, hush.

Immelt was flying around like this with the shareholders’ money, not his own. GE under-performed during his tenure, but Immelt’s pay and perks sure didn’t underperform.

Will anything bad happen to anybody as a result of this stupendous waste of shareholder money? Not likely, unless some junior people need to be offered up as scapegoats.

Is it any wonder more and more people are less than impressed with today’s corporations?

 

from Aaron M. Renn
http://www.urbanophile.com/2017/10/30/nobody-knows-nothing-in-corporate-america/

How Regulators Can Support the Innovation Economy

We always hear about how various startups, from household names like AirBnB and Uber to small scale innovators like Josephine, run into regulatory hurdles if not the regulatory buzzsaw.

Macky McCleary, administrator of the Rhode Island Department of Utilities and Carriers, developed an approach in the Ocean State he calls “innovation lanes” to provide a more hospitable regulatory climate for startups. He joined me for a podcast this week to talk about what they are doing in more detail. If the audio player doesn’t display for you, click over to listen on Soundcloud.

Subscribe to podcast via iTunes | Soundcloud.

 

from Aaron M. Renn
http://www.urbanophile.com/2017/10/28/how-regulators-can-support-the-innovation-economy/

Nashville Light Rail vs. Second Ave. Subway

Last night I went to the Upper East Side for a book club I’m part of. I rode the Second Ave. Subway Q-train to get there. When our train left 63rd and Lex around 7:30, it was jam packed. Not the most crush loaded I’ve seen, but pretty crowded. And New York subway trains, especially on the B-division lettered lines, are very high capacity.

I decided to quickly Google up ridership on the Second Ave. Subway extension – a mere four stops if you count 63/Lex – and found that back in May it was already up to 176,000 daily riders.  The entire 90-mile Dallas light rail system, the longest light rail system in the country, only carries around 100,000 daily riders. In fact, that’s more than all but two light rail systems in the country, Boston’s (the Green Line is classified as light rail there) and LA’s, and not by much (226,500 and 211,700 respectively).

The cost of the Second Ave. Subway is indefensible. But it’s obvious that there’s massive rail ridership demand along that corridor to justify building a subway. Four stops on that one small extension basically has more ridership than most complete light rail systems in the US.

I love trains. I like to ride them. I try to take trains and transit whenever possible. Unfortunately, they just don’t make sense in most cities where they weren’t put in place a long time ago.

from Aaron M. Renn
http://www.urbanophile.com/2017/10/27/nashville-light-rail-vs-second-ave-subway/

Why Is the Trump Administration Promoting Further Economic and Media Centralization?

The Federal Communications Commission is planning to lift ownership restrictions on local media. This would allow, for example, ownership of multiple major TV stations in the same market by the same company:

In recent years, the local TV station business has consolidated rapidly, driven by both the growing fees that cable and satellite companies pay for the right to retransmit broadcast signals—bigger station groups can extract higher fees—and increasing competition from the internet. That has led to the emergence of a handful of “super groups” like Sinclair Broadcast Group , which today reaches 45.6% of television households, according to Kagan, a media research group within S&P Global Market Intelligence.

Relaxing regulations on local TV station ownership likely would spark a “bonanza” of dealmaking among station owners, according to station broker Larry Patrick, particularly among the independent station groups that don’t share ownership with broadcast networks like ABC or Fox.

The FCC has also repealed the “main studio rule.”   This rule required radio and TV stations to maintain a staffed local physical studio capable of originating programming. Regarding that republican FCC chairman Aji Pai wrote:

At our October meeting, we’ll also take another step toward the long-overdue modernization of rules governing the media industry. Following up on our Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in May, we’ll vote on an order that would eliminate the “main studio rule.” This rule requires each AM, FM and TV broadcast station to maintain a main studio in or near its community of license. This requirement dates to 1939, and was enacted in part to ensure that stations would stay accessible and responsive to the public. But today, this rule is unnecessary; most consumers get in touch with stations over the phone or through electronic means, stations’ public inspection files are mostly online, and technology enables stations to produce local news without a nearby studio. Additionally, the rule can impose major costs on broadcasters. Eliminating it would make it easier for new broadcast stations to operate in small towns and rural communities. It would also allow broadcasters to spend money currently used to comply with the rule on local programming, newsgathering, and other activities to better serve the public.

If you believe permitting further media consolidation and eliminating local studios is going to result in more local newsgathering and programming, I’ve got a bridge to sell you.

If we take a step back for a minute, we see that in community after community across America, the local institutions that once sustained them as viable places have been gutted or disappeared entirely: local banks, local stores, the local newspaper, manufacturing plants, etc. Some of these were lost due to technology and productivity improvements. In others, some people blame globalization.

But while globalization is well known and well-discussed as a force, there’s another one that’s less talked about. It overlapped with globalization, though started earlier. It was accelerated by globalization, but it is something that was happening anyway. That trend is the centralization of a number of American industries. I explained this in 2010 in a section of a post called “The Nationalization Age”, which I’ll quote in full:

Everyone knows about the [1990s era] tech revolution, but there was a concurrent development that was in many ways equally important. This was the nationalization of business.

Think again back to the 1980’s in a mid-sized or small city. Your hometown probably had three or so major locally based, publicly traded banks. Your state probably severely limited their ability to open branches, so the market was highly fragmented. Your town probably had a couple department stores that were either part of local or regional chains. This might have been true of discounters or even fast food restaurants. The local gas and electric companies were locally based. Only Ma Bell pre-1984 was a national utility, and a heavily regulated one. In short, while may industrial businesses were national in scope, there were still a huge number of industries that were incredibly fragmented into local or regional markets.

The deregulation of the 80’s and 90’s ended that. The end of restrictive banking laws put us where we are today, with a handful of major nationwide banks like JP Morgan Chase, along with a few odd surviving “super-regionals”. Utilities have been sold off. Department stores merged out of existence, perhaps most poignantly illustrated by the rebranding of Marshall Field’s flagship store in Chicago as Macy’s. Macy’s is truly America’s department store now. Wal-Mart and Target, once regional chains, are now ubiquitous. So too Walgreens, CVS, Home Depot, etc.

In short, the business landscape of your city likely changed radically during the 1990’s, as large numbers of locally based businesses, businesses whose executives formed the leadership class of the community, were bought out. (I wrote about one implication of this in my piece “The Decline of Civic Leadership Culture.”)

This also, incidentally, transformed the professional services industry. In 1990 virtually all of these industries were city office based. To be the office managing partner of the biggest office or headquarters city was a huge deal. But in the 90’s, as business changed, and as the level business domain expertise required to integrate technology into business strategies, processes, and organizations became much, much higher, all of these industries restructured into national practices based around industries, with P&L responsibility resting with the industry sector leads. That’s one reason I spent so much time on airplanes in my career.

Of course, this disproportionately benefited large cities in the middle of the country with big airports, where you could base lots of people and fly them conveniently around. Two big winners: Chicago and Dallas.

With so many businesses now large scale, deregulation continuing in vogue, and a post-Cold War end of history euphoria in the air, the stage was set for future liberalization of international trade regimes. Your local bank or store probably didn’t care much about international markets, but Citigroup and Wal-Mart sure did.

There were multiple factors prompting the roll-ups of one sector after another, but one of them was undoubtedly deliberate government policy. In many of these sectors, state and federal regulations were specifically designed to create a fragmented market and keep institutions locally based. The idea that all the banks in your town would be owned by companies in your state capital, much less New York, was anathema.

These rollups did coincide with a nice boom in the 1990s, but since 2000 results have just plain been bad. Barack Obama was the first president since Herbert Hoover to never once hit 3 percent annual GDP growth. President Bush’s economic record was likewise dismal. Job growth in the U.S. since 2000 has averaged 0.5 percent per year, compared to 1.9 percent during the 1980s and 1.9 percent during the 1990s. (Recent years have seen better growth rates than this anemic average.) And real median incomes are lower today than in 2000. Maybe these policies, globalization, etc. didn’t cause these bad results, but results subsequent to these rollups certainly don’t give a ringing endorsement.

When we think about the rise of the coastal and global city economies, we always hear about density, talent concentrations, collisions, and many other things. What we don’t hear about is the way that we specifically eliminated government policies that were designed to keep a handful of coastal cities like New York from dominating the economic life of the country.  The centralization of industries in these cities, along with the rise of global city services, etc. is a big part of what made them so prosperous today. They may not have the lion’s hard of employment, but they extracting an outsize share of the value.

While the President doesn’t directly control the FCC, I find it amazing that the administration of the guy who was elected president in large part because of the hollowing out of communities across the interior in part driven by this centralization would be promoting even more of it. Especially in media, where the collapse of newspapers and such has already had a profoundly negative effect on civic life.

All of this may lead to great economy efficiency in some macro sense. But we’ve already seen the price paid by the loss of these local institutions. Too many cities went from being branch plant towns to being branch everything towns – with no plant anymore.

The coastal folks who are appalled at populism might do well to consider their own role in creating the conditions that brought it about. And the Trump administration should seriously reconsider any regulatory moves designed to actively facilitate further economic concentration in the country.

from Aaron M. Renn
http://www.urbanophile.com/2017/10/26/why-is-the-trump-administration-promoting-further-economic-and-media-centralization/

Why Light Rail Makes No Sense for Nashville

Nashville’s mayor has unveiled a $5.2 billion proposal for a 26 mile new light rail system in five corridors, with a 1.8 mile downtown subway segment. It would be funded by a half-cent initial increase in the sales tax, later boosted to a full cent, plus increases in the hotel and rental cars, and business and excise taxes. But upgrades are part of the program too.

Building a system like this makes no sense in a city like Nashville.

That doesn’t mean light rail would be an active bad for the city, but the gains will probably generate negative ROI, or at a minimum less of an ROI than many alternative ways to spend that kind of money.

The reasons are obvious:

1. Nashville is a very sprawling city with highly dispersed origins and destinations of traffic. It lacks the gigantic downtown employment centers of New York or Chicago that are well-suited to transit. According to the very pro-downtown City Observatory, Nashville only had 143,000 city center jobs in 2011, about 21% of the region’s total jobs. That was for a three mile radius circle around the city center. This generous 28 square mile region is vastly larger than the typical definition of a downtown. Even with red hot job growth, this number would not have grown to a level to justify a major core centric light rail system.

2. Nashville is overwhelmingly a city designed around the car (low density, etc). There’s a very limited quantity of districts designed in a transit oriented way. Basic pedestrian infrastructure is missing in many areas.  I might suggest creating 21st century streets that are humane for pedestrians and bicyclists would be the first priority, and a pre-condition of transit.

Dallas, a much larger region and city, built a similar light rail system that has dramatically underperformed in terms of ridership. It certainly hasn’t been a game changer for the region’s transportation or development patterns. Central Dallas is doing well, but so are other cities without a light rail system. Many thousands of apartments have been going up in central Columbus, for example.  Even huge and relatively dense Los Angeles has been unable to grow its transit ridership despite a massive investment in a vast rail network.

3. Transit and the auto are not good substitutes. Rail transit works best with high density, pedestrian oriented streets, very limited parking, high cost of driving (tolls, parkings), and terrible traffic congestion. So not only will transit not reduce traffic congestion, you almost need more of it to make transit work better. A city that tries to be halfway auto oriented/halfway transit oriented will work well for neither. Deteriorating traffic conditions are probably a given regardless of what the region does, but unless the city and regional really turn the screws on autos (which I doubt they will be able to do) it will be hard to make transit really take off. And maybe not even then (cf: Los Angeles)

4. This is by far the single most expensive capital project ever that I have been able to identify in Nashville. The Music City Center was only about $650 million. The city’s airport expansion is planned for $1.2 billion. Building a light rail system would be much, much more expensive than these already financially large projects. How many projects of $5.2 billion or more have any metro areas the size of Nashville built? I can’t think of one offhand, but there can’t be that many of them in any case. The ROI hurdle for something like this is enormous – especially if you consider that this is not a metro wide project but Davidson County only.

5. And don’t forget, comes with a large capital replacement tail. Agreeing to build something shiny and new is one thing. Finding the billions it will take to reconstruct just to keep it at end of lifecycle is another. Just ask Washington Metro riders.

Even if the money is totally wasted, which it would not be, building a $5.2 billion light rail system still wouldn’t sink the city. But you’ve only got so much money to go around. At a 10.25% sales tax as proposed, Nashville would likely be tapped out here in terms of future tax increase. You’ve also only got so much management time and attention to give. Is this where you want to put your money and your time?

This is a great example of interior cities being unable to transcend coastal definitions of what a “major league city” should look like. Nashville does need to reinvent its transport infrastructure for the modern area and to accommodate growth. It has the opportunity to do that in a way contextually appropriate to what it is. Instead, they’ve chosen to simply try to copy what Portland did way back in the day.

Nashville, by not turning its back on country music but embracing it, showed how it’s done from a brand perspective. They weren’t afraid to be different from the coasts in ways that might be perceived as déclassé. They should find it within themselves to channel that same spirit when it comes to transportation.

from Aaron M. Renn
http://www.urbanophile.com/2017/10/25/why-light-rail-makes-no-sense-for-nashville/

More On Younger Adults With College Degrees

This is a follow-up to my recent piece in the changes in the share of younger adults aged 25-34 with college degrees. A CNN story today has related info too.

I do think it’s important not to get carried away by this. First, looking at stats like percentage of a certain age group with degrees is only one way to slice the data. If you look at just pure metro area percentage growth in younger adults with degree, it’s mostly Sunbelt sprawltowns. The top five are: Riverside-San Bernardino, Las Vegas, San Antonio, Orlando, and Austin. San Francisco is ranked 33rd out of major metro area, though starting from a high base.

All of these dimensions: raw growth, percentage growth, and share growth tell us something about what is going on. We should take a broader look.

Going back to my previous share map, some people said they were surprised that Cincinnati and St. Louis looked so good. I went and looked at it in more detail, and it is in part an artifact of low denominator (total population) growth.

Cincinnati went from 30.5% of 25-34yos with degrees in 2000 to 39.0% in 2016, an 8.5 percentage point gain. Indianapolis went from 30.6% with degrees in 2000 to 37.4% in 2016, a gain of 6.9 percentage points. So Cincinnati appears to have outperformed Indianapolis.

But if you look at those other dimension, Indianapolis grew its total number of young adults with degrees by 40.5%. Cincinnati only grew by 31.4%. Indianapolis added 30,860 young people with degrees, which is more people with degrees than Cincinnati’s 26,744. It looks like Indianapolis attracted a lot more people without degrees than Cincinnati, which dragged its percentage down.

Again, both numbers matter. Indianapolis grew its higher skilled labor force in that age bracket by more than Cincinnati did, but Indy is going to have the feel of a slightly less educated place overall.

I also got in inquiry from Crain’s Chicago about county level data for that region. I pulled it, and it looked weird. Two of major mature suburban, decently upscale counties, DuPage and Lake, both lost younger adults with degrees. I asked asked Crain’s to sanity check this with demographer Rob Paral, and it’s apparently accurate. I put together the following chart of percentage growth in adults with degrees for various ages groups for those counties in the following chart:

The high growth of adults with degrees all the way up to 44 is in Cook (Chicago). These younger brackets actually shrank in those suburban counties, which did well in the over 45s. There would appear to have been some significant aging in those suburbs, which could have implications for them in the future. There are a number of suburban and exurban counties I didn’t include. Many of them are growing younger people with degrees. But I found the case of these two large, mature suburban counties interesting.

from Aaron M. Renn
http://www.urbanophile.com/2017/10/24/more-on-younger-adults-with-college-degees/

Handicapping the Amazon HQ2 Bake-Off

I was on WOSU-FM in Columbus, Ohio last week talking about that city’s chances of landing Amazon’s HQ2. Though the short segment focuses on Columbus, I talk a little bit about what criteria I’d be using to make the choice.  If the audio doesn’t display for you, click over to listen on Soundcloud.

Subscribe to podcast via iTunes | Soundcloud.

from Aaron M. Renn
http://www.urbanophile.com/2017/10/23/handicapping-the-amazon-hq2-bake-off/

University of Wisconsin to Consider Shuttering MBA Program

The rising sun shines on Grainger Hall, home to the Wisconsin School of Business at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, during a summer morning on July 9, 2016. (Photo by Jeff Miller/UW-Madison)

The University of Wisconsin School of Business has announced that it is considering closing its MBA program.

Higher education, like business, is in an unprecedented period of accelerated change along several dimensions, including technology, globalization, and the changing expectations of students at all levels. To advance our standing as a top business school, we must respond to this reality.

In this vein, over the last several months, the Wisconsin School of Business has been studying how to best serve students and employers. We are currently having discussions within the School regarding the strategic direction of our portfolio of offerings. Included in the discussion is growing our undergraduate BBA and Master’s programs, evolving the focus of our Centers, and considering the future of the Full-Time MBA. These conversations will continue over the coming weeks and respect our governance processes.

This illustrates the impact of some of the fundamental trends in higher ed I wrote about earlier in the week.

Wisconsin appears to be a very undergraduate focused business school. It has 2,550 undergrads, but only 197 traditional MBA students.  Its MBA program is ranked 34th in the county by US News. So it falls into the category of many Midwest/Big Ten institutions of “good, even very good, but not elite.”  Note that several Big Ten universities have MBA programs ranked below Wisconsin. Rightly or wrongly, this will fuel speculation around many programs ranked in the same tier.

Decisions like this are the subtext of Gov. Scott Walker’s weakening of tenure laws.

“I do not believe the academy is precisely like a business,” Regina Millner, [University of Wisconsin] board president, said at the meeting. “But we cannot have quality, serve our students, have quality faculty if we do not have a sound financial system. This is a different century, this is a different time …. We need to protect that quality by making certain critical decisions.” Repeatedly during the meeting, Millner and other regents cited the need, in an era of tight budgets, for “flexibility” to close programs — and eliminate faculty jobs in the process.

The changes appear to have been designed to allow the university to shutter underperforming programs, which would be difficult to do if tenured faculty couldn’t be laid off.

We will see what the university does, but painful decisions like these are inevitable in era we are in. Every state university is not going to be able to be everything to everybody. They are probably going to have to pick and choose. In the impossible dreamworld, Big Ten schools might event pool some of the programs to specialize across states to help them compete with elite schools, the same way some states like Indiana have partitioned programs within the state.

A final note about the Wisconsin School of Business. In 2007 a group of alumni jointly donated $85 million to the school to purchase the naming rights for 20 years.  The twist is that the school would remain unnamed during that time, and would simply by the School of Business. In an era when donors are eager to plaster their names all over everything they can buy, I think this was one the classiest moves I’ve seen. It would be especially disappointing for them if the school ends up closing after they made such a selfless gift.

from Aaron M. Renn
http://www.urbanophile.com/2017/10/20/university-of-wisconsin-to-consider-shuttering-mba-program/

Superstar Effect, Everything Edition

The Economist has a long and important article in the current issue called “Globalisation has marginalised many regions in the rich world” (now they tell us…).  One of the interesting tidbits in a chart that illustrates increasing concentration among a vast array of industries. They track the share of GDP by industry being generated in the top four metro areas in 2002 and 2014 to show change in concentration overtime.

The dots aren’t all fully labeled and so we really don’t get the details behind his. The key is how many segments have become more concentrated versus less. Again, I’m reminded of former GE CEO Jack Welch, who saw this coming and famously said he only wanted to be in a business if he could be number one or number two. (Subsequently a number of industries rolled up into de facto “two towers” models: CVS and Walgreens, Home Depot and Loews, AT&T and Verizon, etc).

This is putting a lot of regions – the article highlights Scranton – in a serious pinch. There’s a lot in this article, so read the whole thing. Some additional highlights:

Between 1990 and 2010 the rate of economic convergence across American states slowed to less than half what it had been between 1880 and 1980. It has since fallen close to zero. Rich cities started pulling away from less well-off counterparts (see chart 1). According to the Brookings Institution, a think-tank, in the decade to 2015 productivity growth in American metropolitan areas was highest in the top 10% and the bottom 20% (where, by definition, the baseline was low). Struggling middle-income cities like Scranton fell further behind. A recent report by the OECD found that, in its mostly-rich members, the average productivity gap between the most productive 10% of regions and the bottom 75% widened by nearly 60% over the past 20 years.

….

When countries with lots of low-wage workers begin trading with richer economies, pay for similarly skilled workers converges. Those in poor economies grow richer while in rich countries workers get poorer. The effects are felt more in some places than others, and not only because the sort of people who lose out to trade tend to live in similar places. Globalisation did direct damage to many local and regional economies because of the way those regions work.

The past few decades have been good for the richest firms and places. They are as productive as ever; America’s slowing productivity is the result of increasingly poor performance by firms below the upper ranks. Across a wide range of industries the share of output generated by America’s top four metropolitan areas for each industry has risen, often substantially. In the financial industry their share of output rose from 18% to 29%, and in retail, wholesale and logistics from 15% to 21% between 2001 and 2014.

But it is a different story within borders. Diffusion of technology from top firms in one country to laggard firms in the same country has slowed down. The authors of the study reckon that a lack of interest in adapting technologies to local circumstances may account for part of this, suggesting that the more the best firms focus on a global (rather than domestic) market, the slower productivity-improving techniques and technologies spread locally. The rise of superstar firms means that fewer places are home to businesses operating at the productivity frontier and that domestic investment is lower than it should be. In less dynamic local markets, nonsuperstars seem neither willing nor able to adopt the best technology.

 

from Aaron M. Renn
http://www.urbanophile.com/2017/10/19/superstar-effect-everything-edition/